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Abstract 
Although betrayal is a common phenomenon in inter-organizational cross-border 
relationships, the pertinent literature has remained relatively silent as regards its 
examination. However, the effects of betrayal are both long-lasting and destructive, and 
therefore an in-depth investigation of the factors that are driving it, as well as its 
performance outcomes, is considered necessary. Using a sample of 262 exporters, we 
confirm that betrayal in their relationships with foreign buyers is significantly and positively 
affected by relational uncertainty, opportunism, inter-partner incompatibility, relational 
distance, and conflict.  The harmful effect of most of these factors on betrayal becomes 
stronger in the case of high foreign environmental uncertainty and high foreign market 
dynamism. The importer’s betrayal actions are in turn responsible for reducing relational 
performance. In fact, this negative association between importer’s betrayal and relational 
performance is more evident in relationships characterized by low dependence levels and low 
degrees of tolerance by the exporter.   
Keywords 
 Betrayal; exporter-importer relationships; relational performance; exporting; social exchange 
theory. 
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Betrayal in international buyer-seller relationships:  its drivers and performance 
implications  
1. Introduction 
There is a growing understanding among academics and practitioners alike that the 
cornerstone of modern business lies in the quality of the interactive relationships between 
sellers and their buyers (Leonidou, Samiee, Aykol, & Talias, 2014).  In fact, ample evidence 
in the pertinent literature shows that initiating and nurturing such relationships can be 
beneficial for both sellers (e.g., matching products with buyer needs, gaining repeat 
purchases, minimizing customer switching) and buyers (e.g., achieving security in long-term 
supply, rationalizing cost structures, enhancing logistics efficiency) (Sheth & Sharma, 1997).  
However, inter-firm relationships are not always bright, but can suffer from negative aspects, 
which erode trust and fairness perceptions (Eckerd, Hill, Donohue, & Ward, 2013; Wang & 
Huff, 2007), reduce satisfaction levels (Lusch, Brown, & O’Brien, 2011), and even promote 
exiting from the relationship (Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001; Lusch et al., 2011).   
The extant literature has investigated numerous problematic aspects of business 
relationships, such as: relationship unrest (Good & Evans, 2001), relational instability (Das & 
Teng, 2000), relationship dissolution (Lusch et al., 2011), relational damage (Hammervoll, 
2011), destructive acts (Hibbard et al., 2001), opportunism, uncertainty, and negative 
misalignment (Corsaro, 2015), psychological/normative contract breach (Eckerd et al., 2013; 
Lusch et al., 2011), relational risk (Tsai, Lai, Lloyd, & Lin, 2013), and relational stress 
(Holmlund-Rytkönen & Strandvik, 2005).  Although these studies throw light on the dark 
side of buyer-seller relationships, one important issue that remains unexplored is that of inter-
firm betrayal.  Betrayal  signifies a violation of what is good and proper in a relationship and 
can take various forms, such as being disloyal or unfaithful, engaging in deception and lies, 
and failing to meet the hopes or expectations of the other party (Fitness, 2001).   
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Betrayal episodes are not only commonly encountered in working relationships, but 
their effects are long-lasting and destructive (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  Betrayal indicates 
that, compared to the betrayed party, the betrayer acts in a way that favors more only his/her 
own interests, regards his/her needs as more important, and cares very little about or views 
superficially the relationship that they have (Fitness, 2001).  Although anyone entering a 
relationship runs the risk of betrayal, the incidence of betrayal is even more profound in 
cross-border inter-firm relationships because of: (a) the large geographical and psychological 
distance between sellers and buyers; (b) the multiplicity, heterogeneity, and volatility of the 
international business environment; (c) the variable intensity of competitive pressures 
confronted; and (d) the dynamic and unpredictable changes that take place in international 
markets (Leonidou, Kaminarides, & Panayides, 2007; Samiee, Chabowski, & Hult, 2015; 
Sousa & Tan, 2015).   
Understanding betrayal in international buyer-seller relationships is critical on six 
major grounds: (a) international firms have to form relationships with other parties to achieve 
their goals, which, regardless of their maturity, are not immune from betrayal acts (Jones & 
Burdette, 1994); (b) betrayal is considered to be moral violations and deviations from 
established norms (e.g., trust) underlying a business relationship, which can negatively affect 
the welfare and well-being of the interacting parties (Turiel, 1998); (c) betrayal is the 
intentional and targeted behavior by one member of the relationship toward another and can 
have disastrous consequences, not only for the vulnerable party, but for the performance of 
the business relationship as a whole (Kowalski, Walker, Wilkinson, Queen, & Sharpe, 2003); 
(d) betrayal is undertaken by someone who is supposed to be dependable, and therefore can 
cause a lot of disappointment and reduced motivation on the part of the victim (Rachman, 
2010); (e) betrayal poses a threat to the continuation of the relationship, which means that the 
time and effort devoted to the business relationship has been lost, and that enormous costs 
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need to be invested to find new partners (Jones & Burdette, 1994); and (f) betrayal has social 
implications beyond the dyad, with the betrayed party losing self-esteem, and the betrayer 
having a tarnished reputation in the broader business network (Kowalski, 2001a).  
Since betrayal can occur at any time in a business relationship, it is important to know 
the factors that give rise to it and its potential consequences.  Our study aims to shed light on 
these factors by developing and testing a conceptual model, which is anchored on Social 
Exchange Theory.  It specifically focuses on the associations between drivers and outcomes 
of betrayal in exporter-importer (E-I) relationships, as well as examining the contingent role 
of environmental and relational factors.  Our  research objectives are fourfold: (a) to assess 
the influences of relational uncertainty, opportunism, inter-partner incompatibility, relational 
distance, and conflict on betrayal in E-I relationships; (b) to examine the impact of this 
betrayal on relational  performance; (c) to investigate how foreign environmental uncertainty 
and foreign market dynamism moderate the associations between betrayal and its drivers; and 
(d) to explore what contingency effects that dependence and tolerance have on the association 
between betrayal and relational performance. 
Our study contributes to the international business knowledge in a number of ways: 
first, it transfers various useful ideas and concepts from the social psychology discipline to a 
business context in an effective way;  second, it sheds light on betrayal, an issue of major 
concern in inter-organizational working relationships, with serious effects on relational 
performance;  third, it examines the betrayal phenomenon from an international perspective, 
which, as explained earlier,  is very conducive to generating betrayal episodes;  fourth, it 
assimilates, under a unified framework, all possible relationship variables with a potential 
instrumental role in causing betrayal;  fifth, it reveals the contingent role of environmental 
variables which could strengthen the association between betrayal and each of its predictors; 
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and sixth, it shows that under certain relational conditions, the harmful effect of betrayal on 
the performance of the working relationship can increase or decrease.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows.  First, we highlight the nature of 
betrayal, by deriving input mainly from social psychology.  We then examine betrayal from 
the perspective of Social Exchange Theory.  Subsequently, we develop the conceptual model 
of the study and formulate a set of research hypotheses.  The following section provides 
details about the research methodology adopted.  We then explain the analytical procedures 
used and present the research findings.  The article ends with a discussion and implications, 
as well as guidelines for future research.  
 
2. The nature of betrayal 
Betrayal is one of the most common forms of the ‘dark side’ of inter-organizational 
relationships.  It is defined as the voluntary violation of mutual expectations in a relationship, 
where the betrayer favors his/her own interests at the expense of those of the other party 
(Fitness, 2001).  As such, the betrayer considers his/her own needs as more valuable and 
important than those of the other party or the relationship as a whole.  A betrayal takes place 
in a relationship when one party believes that the other has taken advantage of him/her, 
prevented the fulfillment of his/her expectations, and excluded him/her from important 
decisions that influence the prosperity of his/her organization (Reina & Reina, 2006).   The 
key to betrayal therefore depends on beliefs and expectations about how relationships in 
general and the specific relationship in particular should work, and on being confident that 
partners will respect these beliefs and expectations (Jones, Moore, Schratter, & Negel, 2001).  
It is basically a form of ‘breaking the rules of the game’ and violating basic norms and 
expectations. 
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Betrayal can be either accidental (i.e., when the betrayer has no intention of violating 
the expectations of the betrayed party and it is usually associated with regrettable errors) or 
intentional (i.e., when the betrayer intentionally violates the key expectations of the other 
party) (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  The latter is the most common form of betrayal, 
especially when this arises in response to a specific situation in the context of an ongoing 
relationship (opportunistic betrayal).  Betrayal is more likely to arise in transactional rather 
than collaborative relationships, mainly because they promote individualistic interests, as 
opposed to actions characterized by solidarity (Fitness, 2001).  Several signs can help to  
diagnose betrayal behavior, including: perceiving the partner as being critical or dissatisfied 
with a relationship, acting in a guilty or anxious way, and showing reluctance or lack of 
interest in contributing to the relationship (Shackelford & Buss, 1997).  
        Five dimensions characterize betrayal: (a) voluntary, meaning that the betrayer either 
lacks the motivation to conform to the expectations of the betrayed party or has a special 
reason for violating these expectations; (b) pivotal expectations, stressing the fact that only 
expectations (task- or value-related) that are instrumental to the nature of the relationship are 
violated; (c) mutually known expectations, meaning that both parties are aware of the 
expectations (although not necessarily accepting them), so that these cannot be attributed to 
any  misunderstanding or ambiguity; (d) violation of expectations, indicating that betrayal is a 
behavior, and as such refers to actual violation, rather than the mere thought of  betraying; 
and (e) potential to harm, in the sense that the treachery, disloyalty, and deception generated 
from the violation of expectations has the possibility of harming the betrayed party 
(Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).     
Betrayal behavior takes place when the assessment of the perceived relative benefits 
of betraying (e.g., acquiring more resources by using deception) outweigh those of 
maintaining the status quo in the relationship (e.g., paying penalties) (Bies & Tripp, 1996). 
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The possibility of betrayal episodes taking place will depend on three major factors: first,  the 
perceived equity of exchange between the interacting parties, with perceptions of inequity 
giving rise to betrayal because they serve to reduce any guilt or shame the betrayer might 
experience; second, the continuity of the relationship, with betrayal becoming more likely 
when the betrayer believes that the relationship comes to a natural end in the near future, as 
opposed to a relationship that is expected to last longer; and third, the availability of 
alternative parties, with betrayal being more evident when the betrayer enjoys the trust of 
some other parties or perceives that the likelihood of being accepted by other relationship 
partners is high (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).     
The motivation leading one party to betray another in a relationship will depend on 
the perceived likelihood of suffering penalties: if the expected penalties (e.g., imposition of 
financial sanctions) are severe, this will curb actual betrayal behavior (Eoyang, 1994, Sarbin, 
1994).  Although betrayal denotes a violation of trust in the relationship, it is not always 
unethical.  This will depend on the perceived seriousness of the violation and the relative 
centrality of the substituting principle (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  With regard to the 
former, although there is a tendency by the betrayer to find excuses to reduce the feeling of 
guilt or shame that may accompany thoughts of betrayal, when s/he is characterized by a high 
level of moral development it will be recognized as an unethical act.  With regard to the 
second factor, the unethicality of betrayal will depend on the relative importance the betrayer 
attaches to the principle, drive, or value that s/he uses by betraying the other party in the 
relationship (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).          
When a betrayal action is unmasked, there are four possible ways for the betrayer to 
react: (a) to confess that s/he had committed an offence by acknowledging complete 
responsibility for the betrayal act, apologize for what happened, and even seek to restore 
his/her mistake because of feeling guilty; (b) to make excuses for the offence made, such as 
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attributing this to external (e.g., the prevalence of bad politico-economic conditions) or 
internal (e.g., inefficient organizational procedures) factors; (c) to provide justifications (e.g., 
misunderstanding or miscommunication) to minimize the wrongness or seriousness of the 
offence; and (d)  to deny completely that an offence has been made and/or refusal to take any 
responsibility (Chan, 2009; Fitness, 2001).   
Finally, compared to betrayers, betrayed parties are faced with more adverse effects 
and long-term consequences, with betrayal episodes leaving them with negative emotions, 
eroded trust, and expectations for future violations (Chan, 2009; Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, 
& Hannon, 2002; Kowalski, 2001b).  After being exposed, the betrayed party may respond to 
the act of behavior in one of the following ways: (a) to forgive and forget the offence, 
especially if s/he is assured that a betrayal episode will not occur again; (b) to seek ways to 
redefine the relationship with the perpetrator on a more solid base; (c) to keep distance from 
the offender by avoiding or rejecting him/her; (d) to consider the offence unforgivable and 
take steps toward terminating the relationship, and even seek compensation out of it; and (e) 
to take  revenge and make the betrayer suffer through retaliatory measures that will aim 
toward softening his/her own suffering and in this way get even (Fitness, 2001; Kowalski, 
2001b).       
 
3. Social exchange theory and betrayal 
Our study is theoretically anchored on Social Exchange Theory, which states that economic 
exchange alone cannot explain the behavior of parties in an exchange relationship (Cook & 
Emerson, 1978).  Based on this theory, inter-organizational relationships are characterized, 
inter alia,  by exchange elements (e.g., social, business, information), inter-dependencies 
(e.g., depending on each other’s resources), relational investments (e.g., time, effort, and 
resources invested in the relationship), inter-firm bonds (e.g., social. economic, and legal 
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ties),  expectations (e.g., that parties will be faithful to each other), and obligations (e.g., 
financial, contractual, ethical) (Blau, 1964; Foa & Foa, 1974).  
In a social exchange, an action by one party elicits a response from another 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).  More specifically, one party freely delivers a benefit to 
another, thereby creating an obligation for the latter to reciprocate (Whitener, Brodt, 
Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).  As long as the relational parties own and are ready to devote 
resources desired by their partners, the reciprocation of resources makes the relationship 
stronger over time (Aselage & Eisenberger, 2003).  During the process of an exchange 
relationship evolving into one characterized by trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment, the 
parties must adhere to certain rules and norms which constitute the guidelines of social 
exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).  Indeed, reciprocity is the best known rule of 
exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).   However, the voluntary nature of behavior 
implies that benefits provided to the partner may not be reciprocated (Whitener et al., 1998).  
The reciprocal nature of inter-organizational relationships is illustrated by the 
psychological contract perspective (Robinson & Morrison, 1995).  A psychological contract 
can be defined as a set of beliefs that relational parties hold with respect to reciprocal 
obligations between themselves and their partners (Morrison & Robinson, 1997).  Such 
obligations originate from perceived promises and may or may not be shared by the parties in 
the relationship (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989).  In this sense, psychological 
contracts are “the subjective conceptualization” and “idiosyncratic interpretations” of 
exchange terms (Eckerd et al., 2013).  Such contracts emerge within a relationship and Social 
Exchange Theory implies that social interactions are based on expectations of gaining 
rewards and escaping punishments (Lusch et al., 2011).  In buyer-seller working 
relationships, expectations develop by taking into consideration how contributions from one 
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party will be reciprocated in future, while the absence of reciprocation will place future 
interactions at risk (Lusch et al., 2011).    
While the psychological contract implies that if each party fulfils his or her own 
obligations in the relationship, it will be mutually advantageous, contract breaches (followed 
by contract violations) loosen relational ties and shake the faith of the affected party in the 
benefit of continuing the relationship (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).  Psychological contract 
breach materializes when a relational party recognizes that the exchange partner has failed to 
fulfill his or her obligations in the psychological contract in a way that is disproportionate to 
the former’s contributions (Morrison & Robinson, 1997).  Violation of psychological 
contracts evokes feelings of betrayal (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994), because the trust arising 
from the belief in reciprocal contributions is violated (Rousseau, 1989).  Violation represents 
unfair treatment and the injustice inherent in this behavior leads to the weakening of bonds, 
doubts about the reciprocation of contributions, a reluctance to engage in extra-role behavior, 
and even to retaliation to maintain the balance between what is given and what is received 
(Robinson & Morrison, 1995).  
Based on the Social Exchange Theory, a betrayal is viewed as the violation of implicit 
or explicit norms of decency and fairness that are assumed to govern the relationship, which 
ultimately damages the integrity of the roles of the interacting parties and leads to negative 
emotional and behavioral responses (Buunk & Dijkstra, 2006; Fitness, 2001; Hannon, 
Rusbult, Finkel, & Kamashiro, 2010).  According to this theory, an act of betrayal by one 
party in the relationship increases the costs of the relationship, which outweigh the benefits 
derived by the betrayed party (Buunk & Dijkstra, 2006).   Some of the reasons for betrayal 
can be ascribed to the existing relationship being unsatisfactory, inefficient, and 
counterproductive, thus reducing the interest in putting more energy, time, and effort into it 
and even encouraging thought of its termination (Barta & Kiene, 2005).  
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4. Conceptual model and research hypotheses 
Our conceptual model consists of eleven constructs categorized into four groups (see Figure 
1).  Relational uncertainty, opportunism, inter-partner incompatibility, relational distance, and 
conflict are drivers of betrayal in the E-I relationship.  The existence of betrayal subsequently 
negatively affects relational performance.  The link between drivers of betrayal is moderated 
by the degree of foreign environmental uncertainty and foreign market dynamism.  In 
addition, the link between betrayal and relational performance is moderated by dependence 
and tolerance.  Altogether, there are six direct effects hypotheses and four moderation 
hypotheses, which are explained in the following.  
…insert Figure 1 about here… 
4.1. Direct effects hypotheses 
Relational uncertainty refers to the degree to which the future status, directions, and outcome 
of the working relationship between a seller and a buyer can be predicted (Rosson & Ford, 
1982).  It basically denotes a degree of confidence that one party has in his/her perceptions of 
involvement within a relationship with another (Solomon & Knobloch, 2001).  Relational 
uncertainty is measured in terms of doubts or questions about: (a) one’s own view of the 
relationship; (b) the partner’s involvement in the relationship; and (c) the future of the 
working relationship (Knobloch & Theiss, 2012; Priem & Solomon, 2011).  Relational 
uncertainty is a meaningful phenomenon for international markets, since it is very difficult to 
objectively evaluate the overseas partner’s performance and conformity to norms due to the 
distance between the two parties (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986).  Such uncertainty can create 
expectancy violations (e.g., goal achievement, mutuality of benefits, norms for behavior) 
among the parties involved in the relationship, which can be harmful for the continuation of 
the relationship (Affifi & Metts, 1998).  Under conditions of relational uncertainty, 
information about the partner’s actions and intentions, as well as about how the relationship 
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will develop in the future, is inadequate (Molm, Schaefer, & Collett,  2009).  Interactions 
with a business partner are also more unpredictable and uncontrollable (Priem & Solomon, 
2011).  This gives room for betrayal to arise, because if the future of the relationship is 
questionable, business partners will lose their importance and little benefit will be seen in 
maintaining the relationship (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  Moreover, relational uncertainty 
blurs the perception of what the parties owe to each other and increases the likelihood of 
violation of relational norms (Morrisson & Robinson, 1997).  Furthermore, it can reduce 
loyalty and cause deception, due to the ill-fulfillment of expectations arising from the 
relationship (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  In international business relationships such 
uncertainty has been reported to impair relationship quality and harmony (Leonidou, Barnes, 
& Talias, 2006; Leonidou, Katsikeas, & Hadjimarcou, 2002), leaving partners with little 
reason to attain joint goals (Robson, Spyropoulou, & Al-Khalifa, 2006).  Hence, we may 
hypothesize that: 
H1: The higher the level of relational uncertainty in the E-I relationship, the greater the 
likelihood of betrayal. 
 Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile, which is expressed in a 
relationship in terms of subtle (e.g., camouflaging poor work) and/or blatant (e.g., stealing) 
types of behavior (Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1979).  It is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon in inter-firm relationships, which violates implicit and/or explicit agreements 
between the interacting parties and contains some elements of deceit, causing the exposed 
party to suffer (Lui, Wong, & Liu, 2009).  A party may behave opportunistically in order to 
increase its short-term unilateral benefits without caring about the relationship’s long-term 
potential (Brown, Dev, & Lee 2000).  In opportunistic situations, substantial resources are 
devoted to controlling and monitoring the business partner’s activities to make sure that s/he 
fulfills the psychological/legal contract and coordinates joint actions, which increases 
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transaction costs (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  This is especially 
true of international buyer-seller relationships, because the long geographical and 
psychological distance separating exporters from importers provides fertile ground for acts of 
betrayal by complicating the ability to notice and confirm partner’s opportunistic behavior 
(Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009; Luo, 2009).  This is attributed to the fact that such 
distance can create information asymmetry and/or distortions in the information flow, which 
may conceal opportunistic actions and resulting betrayal (Li & Ng, 2002).  The reason why 
opportunism can be a cause of betrayal stems from the fact that it is usually the outcome of a 
self-interest calculation of the pros and cons derived from a particular situation (Elangovan & 
Shapiro, 1998; Luo, 2009).  Indeed, self-interest, which is at the core of opportunism, has 
been the most dominant theoretical explanation of betrayal behavior (Grover, 1997).  
Inevitably, business partners pursuing their own self-interest will betray others whenever this 
is beneficial for them (Grover, 1997).  Opportunism will inevitably impede development of 
reciprocity and commitment among parties (Luo, 2009), lead to questions over the reliability 
of the business partner (Barnes, Leonidou, Siu, & Leonidou, 2010; Katsikeas et al., 2009; 
Saleh, Ali, & Julian, 2014), and heighten risks concerning the future of the international 
business relationship (Chang, Bai, & Li, 2015; Hsieh, Rodrigues, & Child, 2010).   Thus, one 
would expect that: 
H2: The higher the level of opportunism in the E-I relationship, the greater the likelihood 
of betrayal. 
Inter-partner incompatibility refers to the extent to which the goals, strategies, and 
expectations of the parties involved in the working relationship are not aligned (Sarkar, 
Aulakh, & Cavusgil 1998).  In the case of incompatible partners, self-interest seeking actions 
are very likely to appear, which give room for the development of aversive behaviors, as is 
the case with betrayal (Das & Rahman, 2010).  Such incompatibility seems to be more 
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profound when transcending national boundaries, due to: (a) the different and idiosyncratic 
environments in which the interacting parties operate (Luo & Park, 2004); (b) knowledge 
asymmetries about the foreign market characteristics, which may result in a misalignment of 
marketing strategies between importers and exporters (Dou, Li, Zhou, & Su, 2010); and (c) 
different views concerning the deployment of complementary resources by the parties 
involved (Meyer & Altenborg, 2008).  In the case of inter-partner incompatibility, the 
interests of one party are harmed by the actions of the other, and this can give rise to 
instability in the relationship.  The fact of the interacting parties having little in common and 
divergent interests complicates joint decision-making.  This may subsequently lead to 
betrayal, because inter-partner incompatibility can cause the disregarding of rules, the 
breaking of promises, and hoarding of resources, which are instrumental to the rise of 
betrayal episodes (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  In fact, incompatible partners tend to seek to 
achieve their own goals and look after their own self-interest, weakening in this way their 
relational bonds and making the relationship more vulnerable to trust violations (Das & 
Rahman, 2010; Karunaratna & Johnson, 1997).  In contrast, compatible partners look after 
their own interests without jeopardizing those of the other, thereby making room for the 
pursuit of actions of mutual interest (Das & Rahman, 2010).  This is because compatibility 
evokes feelings of coherence and harmony in the relationship, promotes trustworthy acts, and 
encourages hard work and sacrifices for the partner (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 
2001).  Thus, we may posit that: 
H3: The higher the level of inter-partner incompatibility in the E-I relationship, the greater 
the likelihood of betrayal. 
Distance refers to any prevention, delay, or distortion of information exchanged 
between partners in a working relationship that is responsible for keeping them apart (Hallén 
& Wiedersheim-Paul, 1979).  Distance can be caused by various factors, such as social (i.e., 
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differences between business partners’ ways of thinking and working), cultural (i.e., 
dissimilarities between the norms and values of the interacting parties), technological (i.e., 
discrepancies between relationship parties with regard to product and production 
technologies), and temporal (i.e., differences between partners regarding the time when they 
will actually do business together) (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, & Snehota, 2011).  Certainly, 
distance is more evident in an international business setting, in view of the many differences 
that exist in socio-cultural, political-legal, and economic systems, as well as the high physical 
and psychic costs incurred (Stöttinger & Schlegelmilch, 1998).  As such, the prevalence of 
high levels of distance between exporters and importers can create the preconditions in which 
betrayal may take place.  This is because distance can: (a) restrict buyer-seller interactions 
and set barriers to communication, thus limiting the options of creating a sustainable 
relationship (Durand, Turkina, & Robson, 2016; Leonidou et al., 2006); (b) give rise to 
information asymmetry and reduce the possibilities of properly monitoring the foreign 
partner’s activities (Sachdev & Bello, 2014); (c) strengthen the motivation to search for a 
similar or closer foreign partner, as this will reduce the uncertainty associated with his/her 
operations (Griffith & Dmitrova, 2014; Morrison & Robinson, 1997); and (d) encourage 
misinterpretation of the foreign partner’s behavior (Das & Rahman, 2010;  Obadia, 2013).  
Empirical evidence on E-I relationships also suggests that distance could lead to skepticism 
over the honesty, good intentions and fairness of the overseas business partner (Katsikeas et 
al., 2009;  Xie, Li, Su, & Teo, 2010), creates perceptions that the relationship is not 
rewarding and discourages partners from working hard for each other (Leonidou et al., 2006; 
Nordman & Tolstoy, 2014; Skarmeas, Zeriti, & Baltas, 2016); and gives rise to perceptions of 
exposure to unethical business practices, due to different opinions about what is right or 
wrong (Leonidou, Leonidou, Coudounaris, & Hultman, 2013).  Hence, we could assert that: 
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H4: The higher the level of distance in the E-I relationship, the greater the likelihood of 
betrayal. 
 Conflict is defined as blocking behavior that obstructs the members of a working 
relationship from acquiring resources and/or conducting activities necessary for their 
advancement (Anderson & Narus, 1990).  The roots of conflict can be traced to structural 
(e.g., competing for limited resources) and/or attitudinal (e.g., expecting different outcomes) 
reasons, and is usually expressed in terms of disagreements, confrontation, friction, tension, 
frustration, and other negative feelings or actions (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987).  Conflict is 
one of the most pervasive and destructive aspects of a relationship because: (a) it creates a 
blurred picture about how the expectations of the parties involved will be fulfilled; (b) it 
gives the impression that one party is preventing the other from accomplishing its goals; and 
(c) it leads to suboptimal solutions and/or spiraling stalemate (Barnes et al., 2010).  Although 
a certain amount of conflict is inevitable in any kind of relationship, if it becomes 
pathological and gets out of hand, it can be destructive (Brown & Day, 1981).  This is more 
likely to be the case with E-I relationships, whereby the national boundaries separating sellers 
from buyers can give rise to many disagreements due to the fact that the foreign business 
partner: (a) has different traditions, systems, norms, and practices which are indecipherable 
and unpredictable (LaBahn & Harich, 1997; Leonidou et al., 2002); (b) has limited 
information about the market (Rosson & Ford, 1982); and (c) lacks sensitivity to national 
cultures (LaBahn & Harich, 1997).  This existence of conflict can create the preconditions for 
betrayal in an E-I relationship, because of hoarding resources, destructive disagreements, and 
violation of relational norms and values (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  In fact, conflict is 
detrimental to the optimal functioning of the E-I relationship in that it decreases the value 
attached to the other party, creates suspicions about his/her behavior, and makes striving for 
joint goals meaningless (LaBahn & Harich, 1997; Leonidou et al., 2006; Leonidou, Talias, & 
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Leonidou, 2008; Skarmeas, 2006). In addition, due to geographic and psychic barriers 
between the interacting parties, conflict may not be manifested (Leonidou et al., 2006), or, in 
a worse case, may cause communication breakdowns (Barnes et al., 2010).  This, in turn, can 
lead to a short-term escape or ‘avoidance to cope’ situation (rather than actively dealing with 
it), which gives rise to betrayal incidents (Hall & Fincham, 2009).  Hence: 
H5: The higher the level of conflict in the E-I relationship, the greater the likelihood of 
betrayal. 
        As already noted, betrayal is a relationship-destructive behavior which can be expressed 
in various ways, such as breaking a promise, giving a promise with no intention of fulfilling  
it, and actively doing business with other companies outside the relationship (which can 
sometimes be competitors of the current business partner) (Jones & Burdette, 1994; 
Rachman, 2010).  Such behavioral transgressions may represent momentous events in the 
buyer-seller interactions, with the victim’s reactions to betrayal being deterministic for the 
future of the relationship (Aaker, Fournier, & Brasel, 2006; Bello, Katsikeas, & Robson, 
2010).  Betrayal is very likely to take place in cross-border business relations hips because: 
(a) the cultural gap and psychological distance between the interacting parties make the 
monitoring of the importer’s activities by the exporter difficult; (b) the information 
asymmetry, due to the high geographic distance between exporters and importers, makes the 
detection of aversive behaviors in the international markets a rather cumbersome task; and (c) 
the discordant frames of reference and misaligned expectations of exporters and importers 
lead to misinterpretation of the foreign partner’s behavior, thus creating suspicions of 
unfairness and exploitation (Li & Ng, 2002; Katsikeas et al., 2009).  Under these conditions, 
betrayal actions will prevent the parties in the relationship from attaining their goals, 
coordinating venture activities, and carrying out their roles effectively (Kumar, Stern, & 
Achrol 1992).  This is because betrayal denotes violation of contracts and broken promises, 
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which will hinder the implementation of the victim’s plans and waste the victim’s resources 
(Griffith & Zhao, 2015).  The frustration, distrust, and bitterness caused by betrayal can be 
devastating to the party feeling betrayed.  This in turn can have detrimental effects on the 
performance of the relationship and may jeopardize its mere existence (Hollmann, Jarvis, & 
Bitner, 2015).   Hence, the following hypothesis can be made: 
H6: High levels of betrayal in the E-I relationship will lead to low relational performance. 
 
4.2. Moderation hypotheses 
Moral judgments are not based on simple evaluations, but require consideration of 
circumstances under which the violation of expectation takes place (Feldman, Cauffman, 
Jensen, & Arnett, 2000). There are four moderators in our model, namely foreign 
environmental uncertainty, foreign market dynamism, dependence, and tolerance.  While the 
former two refer to characteristics of the foreign environment in which the firm operates, the 
other two moderators are relationship-specific aspects.  With regard to environmental factors, 
these have the ability to influence the behavior of actors in a relationship (Saleh et al., 2014).  
For example, both environmental uncertainty and market dynamism retard the effective 
coordination and ruin the relationship among the interacting parties (Hada, Grewal, & 
Chandrashekaran, 2013).  They also undermine the willingness to fulfill agreed-upon 
obligations, as well as cause difficulties in making adjustments that are critical to preserving 
the relationship (Griffith & Zhao, 2015; Katsikeas et al., 2009).  In the case of the 
relationship-specific aspects, while dependence is one of the factors that forms the relational 
structure and strongly influences the behavior of the parties involved (Geyskens, Steenkamp, 
& Kumar, 1999; Scheer, Miao, & Palmatier, 2015), tolerance represents an important social 
competence in managing business collaborations in which interpretation of behavior 
(including unethical behavior) is subject to misunderstandings (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012; 
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Jonhnson, Lenartowicz, & Apud, 2006). Tolerance also involves recognition and acceptance 
of differences that can change the nature of the response to violated expectations, as in the 
case of betrayal (Geiger et al., 2012; Persell, Green, & Gurevich,  2001). 
Foreign environmental uncertainty is defined as the extent to which the various 
components comprising the firm’s international environment (e.g., economic, political-legal, 
technological, etc) are predictable (Javidan, 1984).  E-I relationships are characterized by 
higher levels of environmental uncertainty due to the complexity, changing nature, and 
multiplicity of the international business environment, such as economic controls, legal 
restrictions, competitive situations, and cultural characteristics (Karunaratna & Johnson, 
1997; Raven, McCullough, & Tansuhaj, 1994; Werner, Brouthers, & Brouthers, 1996).  Such 
situational factors can play an important role in moderating betrayal behavior. For example, 
Sarbin (1994) demonstrated that critical contingencies, such as a financial crisis, may 
increase the probability of the trustee considering betrayal as a solution.  External uncertainty 
also makes conforming to relational norms a cumbersome task for business partners (Ju, 
Zhao, & Wang, 2014).  Indeed, an uncertain environment will provide fertile ground for more 
relational uncertainty, opportunistic behaviors, incompatible actions, loose associations, and 
ongoing disagreements (Leonidou et al., 2006; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002).  
In turn, these will push partners to pursue their own self-interest, rather than common goals, 
and resort to various acts of betrayal with the least amount of damage (Luo, 2005).   For 
example, firms may be reluctant to commit resources to the relationship (Luo, 2007) and even 
look for alternative partners if they promise them a higher performance (Kim, Oh, & 
Swaminathan, 2006).  Moreover, firms may sacrifice mutuality norms for the sake of 
flexibility to cope with the environment (Campbell, 1997).  Furthermore, betrayal could 
sometimes be the reaction of firms in order to mitigate the risk arising from uncontrollable 
environmental forces (Luo, 2007).  Hence, we may posit that: 
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H7: The link between each of the drivers of betrayal and actual betrayal becomes stronger 
when foreign market uncertainty is higher. 
Foreign market dynamism is the perceived frequency of change in marketing forces in 
the firm’s operating market (Achrol & Stern, 1988).  Market dynamism seems to have a 
greater impact on firms engaged in international, rather than domestic, business because: (a) 
they are exposed to many markets and different types of competition; and (b) they are 
confronted with greater distance from the target market, which sets up barriers to the flow of 
information that is vital in coping with and adapting to market changes (Cadogan, Cui, 
Morgan, & Story, 2006).  Under such dynamic conditions, firms are forced to better 
understand their consumers’ needs, quickly absorb information from the market, and 
constantly revise the way their strategy is organized and implemented (Cui, Griffith, & 
Cavusgil, 2005; Shi & Wu, 2011).  These actions will help to make betrayal episodes more 
frequent, due to opportunistic actions (to reap the benefits of fast-changing opportunities), 
loosely connected parties, and increased disagreements (Li & Ng, 2002).  Indeed, in such 
times of change and transition, dyadic parties’ scripts, identities, and expectations are 
challenged (Knobloch & Theiss, 2012).  In this context, the intensity of change in the foreign 
market may create difficulties in anticipating and understanding the task interdependencies 
among exporters and importers, thus reducing the likelihood of mutually adopting relational 
norms (Bello, Chelariu, & Zhang, 2003).  In addition, the fact that profitable market 
opportunities in such times may not be long-lasting and may not arise more than once may 
make the promotion of self-interest actions particularly attractive (Li & Ng, 2002).    We may 
hypothesize that: 
H8: The link between each of the drivers of betrayal and actual betrayal becomes stronger 
when foreign market dynamism is high. 
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Dependence refers to the degree to which one party needs to maintain a relationship 
with another in order to gain desired resources and achieve its goals (Frazier, 1983).  
Dependence will be higher when the required resources cannot be found elsewhere and goals 
can only be accomplished from within the relationship (Andaleeb, 1996).  Lack of familiarity 
with overseas market facts and alternative trade partners increases the company’s dependence 
on its foreign partner (Bello et al., 2003).  In relationships characterized by a high degree of 
dependence, the dependent party is strongly motivated to seek its continuity, because of the 
high value contributions received, the existence of relatively high exit barriers, and the 
difficulties encountered in switching to alternative partners (Goodman & Dion, 2001; Kumar, 
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995).  Thus, even in the case of betrayal incidents, the betrayed party 
will be reluctant to dissolve the relationship because of: (a) the need to achieve its own goals 
and maintain a constant flow of required resources; (b) the lack of qualified alternative 
partners; and (c) the benefits of staying in the relationship outweigh the costs of betrayal 
(Dillow, Afifi, & Matsunaga, 2012; Styles, Ahmed, & Patterson, 2008; Zhang, Cavusgil, & 
Roth, 2003).  Hence, one would expect a milder response to the importer’s betrayal by the 
exporter, in the hope that conditions would improve in the future (Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 
1989).  We may hypothesize that: 
H9: High levels of dependence in the E-I relationship will make the negative link between 
betrayal and relational performance weaker. 
Tolerance is the degree to which one party accepts the other’s actions/characteristics 
with which the former disagrees, disapproves of, or dislikes (Van Doorn, 2014). Tolerance 
denotes acceptance of, as opposed to fighting, ignorance, or coping with, the different 
behavior of other parties, and the compromise that prompts relational partners to accept less 
than what they desire (Van Doorn, 2014).  In other words, tolerance of deviation involves the 
acceptance of various types of transgressions (such as betrayal), which violate the 
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fundamental principles (such as fairness) (Feldman et al., 2000). In a business context, 
tolerance involves acceptance of inconvenience without retribution (Autrey, Skinner, & 
Lamb, 2008).  This could matter more in international business relationships where partners 
are located in different countries, representing various cultural and institutional differences, 
and different frames of reference may easily result in misinterpretations (Obadia, 2013).  
Thus, one can expect that highly tolerant business partners, exposed to an act of betrayal, will 
not judge the other’s action, nor exhibit an aggressive reaction to the latter.  They will even 
prefer to resolve the problematic issues leading to betrayal and will not consider exiting the 
relationship (Pettersen & Rokkan, 2006).  Indeed, Montgomery and Brown (1988) have 
shown that low degrees of tolerance were related to a general tendency by the trustee to 
betray his/her relational partner. Tolerance could sometimes be the only venue left to 
overcome conflicts and establish peace in the relationship (Van Doorn, 2014).  Although 
tolerance toward inconveniences may result in a decline in short-term performance, in the 
long run this will increase, due to lower relationship maintenance costs associated with lower 
controlling activities (Autrey et al., 2008).  The following hypothesis can be made: 
H10: High levels of tolerance in the E-I relationship will make the negative link between 
betrayal and relational performance weaker. 
 
5. Study methodology 
 Our sampling frame contained indigenous exporters of manufactured goods located in 
Greece.  We identified participants in the study from the Exporters’ Directory of ICAP 
(2014), which has more than 10,000 entries of firms.  Based on a systematic random 
procedure, we selected a sample of 1,000 firms from this directory.  In each of the selected 
firms, we personally contacted the individual responsible for export operations, who was 
informed about the purpose of the study, and explored his/her willingness to participate.  As a 
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result of this initial contact, 595 firms accepted to take part in the study.  Most reasons given 
by those who rejected participation included: lack of available time, company policy against 
responding to surveys, and interruption of export operations.   
 Construct operationalization was based on established scales from the pertinent 
literature (see Appendix for specific construct items).  Specifically, with regard to the drivers 
of betrayal, relational uncertainty was a five-item scale adapted from Leonidou and Kaleka 
(1998), the opportunism scale was based on four items derived from Yilmaz and Hunt’s 
(2001) study, inter-partner incompatibility comprised five items taken from Sarkar et al.  
(1998), relationship distance was a five-item construct extracted from Hallén and Sandström 
(1991), and the conflict scale contained five items identified from studies by Etgar (1979) and 
Kumar et al. (1992).  The betrayal scale comprised five items adapted from the works of 
Coffey, Leitenberg, Henning, Turner, and Bennett (1996) and Grégoire and Fisher (2008), 
while relational performance was a four-item scale based on LaBahn and Harich’s (1997) 
study.  With regard to moderator variables, foreign environmental uncertainty was a five-item 
scale taken from Ganesan (1994), foreign market dynamism included six items extracted 
from Raven et al.’s (1994) study, dependence consisted of four items derived from Jap and 
Ganesan (2000), and the five-item scale of tolerance was based on Pettersen and Rokkan’s 
(2006) work.  The face validity of these scales was evaluated by five academics, with 
extensive knowledge and experience in the international marketing field.  The scales were 
further refined with input received from a panel of export managers.   
 Data were collected through a structured questionnaire, which incorporated the 
aforementioned constructs.1  A seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7), was employed to measure the items contained in each scale.   To achieve 
variability in the results, respondents were asked to take into consideration the third most 
important working relationship with an importer in answering the questionnaire.  The 
23 
 
questionnaire was initially developed in English and then translated into Greek, while a back-
translation procedure revealed no problems.  Before embarking on the full-scale study, we 
pre-tested the questionnaire with five export managers to ascertain its flow, duration, and 
ease of response, and made only a few minor adjustments.   
All firms willing to participate in the study were sent a mailed (and in some cases 
electronic) questionnaire, with a covering letter explaining the purpose, usefulness, and 
confidentiality of the study.  In order to improve responsiveness, we sent reminder letters, 
called them by telephone, and even personally visited the companies.  As a result, 268 
questionnaires were returned (i.e., 45% effective response rate), of which 262 were useful.  
The remaining six had to be excluded because of missing data, inconsistencies in the answers 
given, or unsuitability of the key informant.  The possibility of non-response bias was 
examined using Mentzer and Flint’s (1997) method.  For this purpose, we first selected seven 
items belonging to each of the key constructs contained in the conceptual model.   We then 
contacted by telephone 25 of the firms from those that did not reply and asked them to give 
us answers to each of these items.  The answers of these firms were subsequently compared 
to those of the 262 respondents in the main survey.  A t-test analysis between the answers 
given by non-respondents and those obtained by respondents revealed no statistical 
significant differences, indicating the absence of non-response bias.  
 
6. Research findings 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) based on the EQS program was employed to analyze the 
data.  Initially, following Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis on the main constructs of our model by constraining each item to load on its pre-
specified factor, while allowing the underlying factors to correlate.  Elliptical re-weighted 
least-square (ERLS) procedure was used to estimate the measurement model, revealing a 
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very good fit to the data (χ2 = 1578.12, p = .000, df = 979; NFI = .93; NNFI = .96; CFI = .96; 
RMSEA = .05) (see Table 1). 
…insert Table 1 about here… 
Convergent validity of study constructs was met, as the t-value for each item was 
always high and significant, all standard errors of the estimated coefficients were very low, 
and the average variance extracted for each construct was equal to or exceeded the cutoff 
point of .50 ( Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2011).  Discriminant validity was 
also confirmed, since the confidence interval around the correlation estimate for each pair of 
constructs examined never included 1.00 (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988), while all average 
variances extracted were higher than the squared correlation for each pair of constructs 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981) (see Table 2).2 Construct reliability was satisfactory, as 
Cronbach’s alphas for all constructs in our model were greater than .70, while composite 
reliability scores for all constructs were above the recommended threshold of .60.  
Because the data were collected from one informant at a single point in time, we 
assessed the possibility of common method bias.  First, we conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis, in which all items included in the measurement model were constrained to load on a 
single factor (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).  The model fit indices revealed very poor 
values, well below the commonly acceptable cut-off points (i.e., χ2 = 2185.49, p = .000; df = 
464; NFI = .77; NNFI = .79; CFI = .80; RMSEA = .14).   Second, we used a post hoc 
identification of a marker variable by selecting the second smallest positive correlation 
between the constructs of our model (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006).  We then adjusted the 
correlation matrix using this correlation.  A comparison between the original and the adjusted 
correlation matrix revealed that the differences were small and the patterns of significance 
remained the same (p < .05, two-tailed).  Collectively, the results from these two tests 
indicate that common method bias does not constitute a problem in this study. 
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…insert Table 2 about here… 
The hypothesized links between the constructs were tested by estimating the structural 
model.  The analysis revealed a very good model fit, as demonstrated by the ratio of Chi-
square by the degrees of freedom (χ2/df) = 2.97 and the results of the alternative fit indices 
(NFI = .91; NNFI = .93; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .09).  The standardized path coefficients, 
together with the corresponding t-values of the structural model, are presented in Table 3.   
Our findings confirm a positive link between relational uncertainty and betrayal (β= .30, t= 
3.29, p= .00), thus supporting H1.  They also lend support to H2, as we confirmed that 
opportunism gives rise to betrayal acts in E-I relationships (β= .19, t= 2.37, p= .02).  The 
results of our analysis also verify the positive relationship between inter-partner 
incompatibility and betrayal (β= .21, t= 2.40, p= .02), hence supporting H3.  H4 was also 
confirmed, since relational distance between exporters and importers was found to positively 
affect betrayal (β= .32, t= 3.76, p= .00).   We also demonstrate that the presence of conflict in 
the E-I relationship is instrumental in promoting betrayal acts (β= .28, t= 3.41, p= .00), 
thereby supporting H5.  In support of H6, it was also confirmed that the existence of betrayal 
in the relationship leads to low relational performance levels (β= -.39, t= 4.56, p= .00).   
…insert Table 3 about here… 
With regard to moderation effects (see Table 4), we have used the split group method 
(based on the median) to identify sub-samples of respondents for each moderator (either 
‘low’ or ‘high’).  In the case of our first moderator, it was confirmed that when environmental 
uncertainty was high, the negative impact on betrayal by relational uncertainty (∆χ2= 2.98, p< 
.10), opportunism (∆χ2= 5.13, p< .05), inter-partner incompatibility (∆χ2= 3.14, p< .10) and 
conflict (∆χ2= 4.05, p< .05) became stronger.  However, no moderating effect was recorded 
by environmental uncertainty on the link between relational distance and betrayal (∆χ2= 1.77, 
p> .10).  With regard to foreign market dynamism, this was found to moderate the link 
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between relational uncertainty and betrayal (∆χ2= 2.89, p< .10), between opportunism and 
betrayal (∆χ2= 2.87, p< .10), between inter-partner incompatibility and betrayal (∆χ2= 2.96, 
p<.10), and between relational distance and betrayal (∆χ2= 8.40, p< .01).  However, contrary 
to our hypothesis, foreign market dynamism did not have a moderating impact on the conflict 
→ betrayal link (∆χ2= 1.15, p> .10).  The results also support the moderating roles of 
dependence and tolerance between betrayal and relational performance.  In the case of 
dependence, it was confirmed that in E-I relationships characterized by high dependence 
levels between the interacting parties, the association between betrayal and relational 
performance becomes weaker (∆χ2= 2.84, p< .10).  Finally, high levels of tolerance were also 
found to weaken the effect of betrayal on relational performance (∆χ2= 2.80, p< .10).   
…insert Table 4 about here… 
 
7. Discussion and implications 
Our findings indicate that betrayal is indeed pivotal in determining the success or failure of a 
working relationship. However, although betrayal has been well investigated at the 
interpersonal level, our knowledge at the inter-organizational level is virtually non-existent.  
Betrayal is very likely to arise in an E-I relationship when this is characterized by high levels 
of relational uncertainty, opportunistic actions, incompatible roles, distance, and conflict.  
The instrumental role of these parameters in causing betrayal actions becomes stronger in the 
case of E-I relationships taking place in foreign markets characterized by high uncertainty 
and dynamism.  It was also confirmed that the existence of betrayal in the E-I relationship 
can lead to poorer relational performance.  However, the existence of high levels of 
dependence, coupled with high levels of tolerance, can weaken the negative impact of 
betrayal on relational performance.    
27 
 
Our results highlight the role of five crucial relational factors in predicting betrayal in 
E-I relationships.  First, uncertainty about the value of future exchanges with a business 
partner and the resulting feelings of insecurity discourage engagement in the E-I relationship 
and increase the inclination of betrayal episodes (Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2008).  This is 
because relational uncertainty decreases the importance of the relationship, increases the 
likelihood of violating relational norms, and leads to unfulfilled expectations. Second, our 
findings reinforce the devastating effect of opportunistic actions in E-I relationships, which 
shakes the belief that none of the interactive parties will inflict harm on the other, and 
corroborate the adverse influence of self-interest seeking at the expense of the other party 
(Lee, 1998).  By promoting self-interest, which is the essence of opportunism, betrayal is 
very likely to take place.   Third, we emphasize that the misalignment of goals and strategies 
between the interacting parties reduces the importance of pursuing mutual interests, and, 
instead, leads to the adoption of more selfish behavior.  Such a misalignment is very likely to 
lead to broken promises, violation of rules, and the withholding of important resources, which 
can provoke betrayal actions (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  Fourth, we accentuate the fact 
that the existence of social, cultural, technological or temporal distance between exporters 
and their import buyers can increase the rate of betrayal incidents by the latter.  This confirms 
the detrimental effects of distance on properly monitoring and understanding the foreign 
partner’s behavior and intentions.  Fifth, our results support the view that conflict puts 
pressure on interacting parties to attain their own short-term performance objectives, at the 
expense of the future of the relationship (LaBahn & Harich, 1997). Destructive 
disagreements, violation of relational norms, and the hoarding of resources are some of the 
side effects of conflict, which help to give rise to betrayal acts. 
Study results also indicate the role of two important environmental variables for 
international business, namely environmental uncertainty and market dynamism, in 
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amplifying the influence of relational antecedents on betrayal. In fact, environmental 
uncertainty can increase the probability of partners in a relationship considering betrayal as 
an option, because of weakening relational norms and negative information asymmetries 
(Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990).  The only exception to this moderation effect was the link 
between relational distance and betrayal.  This could be because social, cultural, 
technological and other differences between exporters and importers are highly conducive to 
the emergence of betrayal actions, regardless of the level of environmental uncertainty.  With 
regard to foreign market dynamism, these results denote that foreign market conditions, that 
are rapidly changing, can cause new opportunities and/or threats in the working relationship, 
which can induce self-interest, individualistic actions, and ultimately betrayal incidents.  
The strong negative effect of betrayal on relational performance in the E-I relationship 
can be attributed to the fact that betrayal leaves the victims with negative evaluations, 
emotions, and behavioral tendencies associated with the instigator, as well as with pessimistic 
expectations about the future of the relationship (Finkel et al., 2002).  Betrayal also puts the 
integrity of the relationship at risk, because if one party engages in trust-violating actions 
(e.g., cheating), s/he will misguide the relationship (Grover, 1997).  Participants in the study 
stressed that betrayal episodes by their foreign buyers can cause ineffectiveness and 
inefficiencies in the working relationship, and create a feeling of devastation and pessimism 
about its future.  In fact, some of them stated that because of these betrayal incidents they 
were on the verge of breaking up their relationship with the foreign partner.   
  Dependence on and tolerance toward the overseas business partner are found to 
dampen the negative impact of betrayal on relational performance.  This is because being 
dependent on another party allows betrayal actions to be seen from a ‘softer’ lens, because 
the benefits of maintaining the relationship outweigh the costs of applying sanctions, such as 
imposing penalties, finding another partner, or even exiting the relationship.  Also, dependent 
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firms need their partners to attain their goals and, even if they are faced with a destructive act, 
they exhibit passive acceptance, rather than disengagement (Hibbard et al., 2001).  Thus, if 
the foreign business partner is considered irreplaceable (because, for example, of a strong 
market position), the betrayed party will prefer to remain in the relationship.  On the other 
hand, a tolerant party is more willing to accept and withstand any negative actions performed 
by the other party, as in the case of betrayal.  In fact, tolerant parties possess good emotional 
regulation strategies and communication skills, which help them to keep harmonious 
relationships with their business partners (Xu, Oei, Liu, Wang, & Ding, 2014).   
7.1. Theoretical implications  
A number of theoretical implications can be derived from the findings of this study.   First, it 
was shown that various ideas and concepts developed within the social psychology discipline 
can be transferred, with some modifications, to a business context.   Specifically, although 
betrayal has been developed within the realms of interpersonal relationships, we have 
demonstrated that it can also apply to the case of inter-organizational relationships.  Hence, 
there is room to expand our understanding on betrayal by borrowing more input from the 
field of social psychology (as well as other disciplines), such as that relating to antecedents 
(e.g., personality traits of managers), moderators (e.g., penalty assessment), and outcomes 
(e.g., revenge) (Adams, Luevano, & Jonason, 2014; Chan, 2009; Joskowicz-Jabloner & 
Leiser, 2013).  
Our study has stressed the crucial role of betrayal in cross-border inter-organizational 
relationships, an issue that has remained hidden until now. However, betrayal is a key 
construct characterizing business relationships and, as such, it warrants further attention by 
business scholars.  The fact that all antecedent factors (i.e., relational uncertainty, 
opportunism, inter-partner incompatibility, relational distance, and conflict) of betrayal, as 
well as its performance outcomes, were found significant gives credibility to the analogy 
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drawn between interpersonal relationships and inter-organizational relationships.  This 
empirical verification of our conceptual model is in line with Social Exchange Theory, which 
implies that favorable treatment in a relationship is reciprocated with positive behavior, while 
unjust treatment is reciprocated with undesirable behavior (Hekman, Bigley, Steensma, & 
Hereford, 2009). 
The role of external forces, namely foreign market uncertainty and foreign market 
dynamism, as moderators between antecedent factors and betrayal, is also noteworthy.  This 
stresses the role of the foreign environment within which the relationship operates in shaping 
the atmosphere of the interacting organizations.  The complex and volatile nature of this 
environment necessitates closer monitoring, with the examination of additional parameters 
pertaining to the macro-environment (e.g., political-legal) and the task environment (e.g., 
competition). Surprisingly, prior research on the dark side of inter-organizational 
relationships has placed little emphasis on the contingent role of the external environment, 
and this is also true with regard to research in interpersonal relationships.  The contingency 
effects of these variables suggest that some organizational factors (e.g., adaptive capabilities) 
associated with the firm’s reaction to environmental changes might also act as moderators.  
The confirmed moderating role of dependence and tolerance on the association 
between betrayal and relationship performance gives support to the idea that the structure of 
the relationship and the attitude toward violations may change the reactions of the betrayed 
party.  Specifically, we have shown that with regard to dependence, the extent to which 
international business partners rely on each other for critical resources softens the victim’s 
reaction to the betrayal act, while, in the case of tolerance, the attitude of business partners 
toward differences and violations serves as a social skill that can save the relationship from 
disruption or dissolution.  This clearly demonstrates the important role of relational factors in 
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shaping the betrayal-performance relationship, and makes room for the examination of other 
similar factors, such as that of network embeddedness.  
7.2. Managerial relevance 
Important managerial implications derive from this study.  First, export and import managers 
should maintain a healthy association in order to prevent incidences of betrayal, which can 
harm the performance of the relationship.  In doing so, they need to reduce the level of 
uncertainty in their working relationships with foreign partners, by intensifying information 
exchange, formulating commonly agreeable plans, enhancing communication procedures, 
and improving coordination efforts.  These will not only create expectations of reciprocity, 
but will also help to have a better insight into and ability to predict each other’s actions.  This 
is particularly critical during the times of change and transition in relationships (e.g., contract 
renewal), when uncertainty is more likely to emerge (Steuber & Solomon, 2009). 
Managers also need to put aside their self-interest, but rather strive to achieve results 
that will be beneficial to both parties.  In order to accomplish this, they need to carefully 
select their foreign partners, so as to reduce the chances of opportunistic behavior (Wathne & 
Heide, 2000).  But even during the development of the working relationship, it is important to 
put in place proper safeguards, such as contractual agreements, monitoring mechanisms, and 
relational norms that will help to avoid opportunistic actions.  The role of having a constant 
flow of timely, accurate, and in-depth information between the interacting parties is of 
paramount importance in reducing opportunism and the betrayal resulting from it.   
Efforts should also be made to align the norms, roles, and responsibilities in the 
relationship, to avoid incompatibility problems. This calls for searching carefully for a 
compatible international business partner in terms of goals, strategies, and expectations. In 
particular, export and import executives should think of how to complement their business 
and contribute to the other’s business performance.  Interacting parties should also frequently 
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reassess and harmonize their goals, strategies, and business practices, and if necessary 
consider offering mutual concessions. They also need to better understand each other’s 
idiosyncrasies and difficulties, especially in light of environmental uncertainties and 
unexpected events.   
The finding regarding relational distance implies that international buyers and sellers 
should develop a conciliatory attitude by extending efforts to understand, as opposed to 
ignoring, differences between themselves.  Distance in the relationship should also be 
reduced through greater familiarity with factual, analytical, and experiential issues with 
regard to the foreign partner’s organization and country.  Area briefings, sensitivity training, 
and field trips can seriously help to reduce such inter-firm distance.  This would also prevent 
any misunderstandings which can lead to (or be interpreted as) betrayal actions.  
It is also important to take some pre-emptive measures to avoid conflict in the 
relationship, and, in case this does arise, to make sure that it is functional (i.e., contributing to 
the long-term viability of the relationship), overt (i.e., making interacting parties aware of its 
existence), and controllable (i.e., allowing its resolution in an amicable and mutually 
beneficial way). This requires clear definitions of the roles of each party, candid and 
extensive discussion of disagreements, and the respecting of (and sometimes adherence to) 
different views.  
International business executives should also become more alert to betrayal actions in 
cases of high environmental uncertainty (e.g., financial crisis) and volatile markets (e.g., 
changing consumer needs).  Under these conditions, they need to carefully monitor their 
partner’s actions (e.g., by checking whether agreements are being followed) and adopt a more 
proactive, rather than reactive, perspective.  By doing so, the existence of  open and direct 
communication between the interacting parties will prove useful in capturing and 
accommodating environmental and market changes. 
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Given the weakening effects of dependence and tolerance on the link between 
betrayal and relational performance, interacting parties may think about increasing the level 
of their interdependence by boosting relationship-specific investments or increasing the level 
of mutual adaptations. This will not only act as a safeguard against betrayal actions, but, even 
if they occur, will also help to reassess the relationship and keep it alive.  Since a good 
business partner is not easily found, once an act of betrayal is spotted, it is important to 
understand the roots of the problem (e.g., a cultural misunderstanding) and work together 
toward reassessing the relationship in order to benefit both parties. 
 
8. Directions for future research 
Future research should take a number of directions.  For example, the fact that this study is 
possibly among the first to investigate betrayal in international business relationships makes 
it imperative to obtain its external validity by extending the study to other country settings 
(e.g., emerging economies), as well as to other international relational contexts (e.g., strategic 
alliance partner relationships).   Testing the model in comparative research designs (e.g., low 
versus high context cultures) would be particularly valuable to better understand the 
interaction of variables in various contexts.  It would also be interesting to examine 
differences in the antecedents and consequences of betrayal incidences that are taking place 
in domestic versus international market settings. 
 Our model consists of constructs that, with the exception of foreign environmental 
uncertainty and foreign market dynamism, could equally be applied to domestic buyer-seller 
relationships.  Thus, there is a need to augment the model with constructs that have a more 
international flavor, such as the role of cultural differences, institutional distance, and 
internationalization stages.  Another dimension that needs improvement has to do with the 
fact that some of our scales, although established, coming from reliable sources, and 
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extensively used in the literature, were outdated.   There is therefore a need to operationalize 
the constructs used in the study with more recent scales, and if necessary to embark on the 
development of new ones following the procedures recommended by Churchill (1979).    
Despite the dynamic nature of relational phenomena, the study adopted a cross-
sectional research design.  Although under certain conditions, the results from cross-sectional 
data exhibit validity comparable to the results obtained from longitudinal data (Rindfleisch, 
Malter, Ganesan, & Moorman, 2008), for future research, longitudinal studies that cover 
changes in the relationship dynamics over time are recommended.3  This is particularly 
important in light of the fact that betrayal incidences are usually repeated over time and there 
is therefore a need to monitor their development and the forms they take.  It would also be 
interesting to explore the short-term and long-term effects of betrayal on relational 
performance. Researchers could also examine how the levels of tolerance and dependence 
change over time and how these changes in turn affect the link between betrayal and 
relational performance.  It would also be interesting to see changes in betrayal patterns over 
different relationship stages, such as initiation, growth, maturity, and decline.  
The study involved only the perspective of the seller side of the international business 
relationship, although working relationships have at least two parties.  This requires the 
adoption of dyadic methods of data collection (i.e., obtaining the opinions of both exporters 
and importers) on issues associated with betrayal.  This is critical, because the way the two 
parties perceive, evaluate, and respond to betrayal episodes is usually not the same 
(Kowalski, 2001a).  Hence, betrayal should be explored from the perspective of both the 
victim and the instigator.  In addition to inter-organizational perspectives, researchers could 
also examine betrayal from the perspective of boundary spanners (salespeople and purchasing 
employees), which could shed more light on the psychological damage of betrayal at the 
interpersonal level. 
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Since betrayal can also be driven by personal (e.g., Machiavellianism), organizational 
(e.g., strategy), and institutional (e.g., law enforcement) factors, the role of predictors of 
betrayal is worth investigating.  In addition to perceptual consequences, betrayal may also 
have attitudinal (e.g., hostility), behavioral (e.g., reciprocation), and emotional (e.g., 
dissatisfaction) outcomes, which call for scholarly attention.   It would also be interesting to 
examine the moderating role of governance mechanisms (e.g., markets versus hierarchies), 
temporal factors (e.g., new versus old relationships), and cultural differences (e.g., high 
versus low uncertainty avoidance).  The control effect of the stage and depth of the 
relationship on betrayal also warrants further investigation.  
Finally, our focus in this study was based on a quantitative analysis.  However, since 
betrayal can take various forms (e.g., cheating, breaching contracts, infidelity to the business 
partner), be expressed in alternative ways (e.g., accidental/opportunistic, one-off/repeated, 
overt/covert), and be influenced by the idiosyncrasies of the interacting parties in different 
international settings, a more in-depth investigation based on qualitative research methods 
would be valuable.  Some topics to be explored could be the way in which perceptions and 
reactions associated with betrayal differ across cultures, how the process leading to the 
creation of betrayal evolves, how the contextual conditions in different markets influence the 
emergence of betrayal episodes, how the aftermath of betrayal is handled, and how the socio-
cultural characteristics of business partners influence the likelihood of engaging in acts of 
betrayal.   
Notes 
1. To check for the potential of key informant bias, a set of questions was also inserted at the end of the 
questionnaire, assessing on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high)) the degree of 
familiarity, knowledgeability, and confidence of the respondents to provide the information required, this being 
always above the average (Cannon & Perreault, 1999). 
2. We also used an additional test of discriminant validity, whereby the two-factor CFA models that involve all 
possible pairs of constructs are tested.   For each pair of constructs, we compare the χ2 of the two-factor with 
that of the one-factor model.  In the one-factor, all items are forced to load on a single factor, whereas in the 
two-factor model, each item is allowed to load only on its respective latent factor.  The χ2 of all two-factor 
models are significantly lower than for the one-factor models (∆χ2(1) > 3.84). 
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3. Although longitudinal research is desirable, it has certain limitations, such as: (a) additional expenditures in 
terms of time and money; (b) confounds due to intervening events; and (c) reduction in sample size due to 
respondent attrition (Rindfleisch et al., 2008).   
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Table 1: Measurement Model and Summary Statistics 
Constructs Scale 
items 
Standardized 
Loadings 
t-
value 
α ρ AVE Mean 
score 
Standard 
deviation 
Item 
mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Relational 
Uncertainty 
 
UNC1 
UNC3 
UNC4 
UNC5 
.74 
.66 
.57 
.56 
* 
8.23 
7.06 
6.99 
.73 .67 .50 2.93 1.09 2.33 
2.78 
3.75 
2.85 
1.41 
1.48 
1.68 
1.27 
Opportunism 
 
OPP1 
OPP2 
OPP3 
OPP4 
.73 
.83 
.80 
.56 
* 
10.37 
10.01 
7.00 
.78 .76 .54 2.36 1.30 2.62 
2.05 
2.33 
2.45 
1.57 
1.32 
1.54 
2.10 
Inter-partner 
Incompatibility 
 
INC1 
INC2 
INC3 
INC5 
.70 
.67 
.64 
.56 
* 
7.74 
7.48 
6.70 
.72 .68 .51 2.34 0.95 2.20 
2.16 
2.58 
2.39 
1.23 
1.30 
1.34 
1.29 
Relational 
Distance 
 
DIS1 
DIS2 
DIS3 
DIS4 
DIS5 
.68 
.81 
.65 
.78 
.58 
* 
8.89 
7.49 
8.71 
6.83 
.82 .78 .50 3.23 1.31 3.68 
3.18 
3.14 
3.31 
2.80 
2.04 
1.80 
1.61 
1.68 
1.44 
Conflict CNF1 
CNF2 
CNF3 
CNF4 
CNF5 
.65 
.85 
.79 
.78 
.81 
* 
9.36 
8.80 
8.74 
9.00 
.88 .83 .60 2.02 1.11 2.26 
2.10 
2.14 
1.94 
1.64 
1.40 
1.46 
1.50 
1.25 
1.06 
Betrayal  BET1 
BET2 
BET3 
BET4 
BET5 
.81 
.81 
.86 
.83 
.78 
* 
11.98 
13.11 
12.45 
11.28 
.91 .85 .67 3.10 1.50 3.14 
3.63 
2.73 
2.76 
3.20 
1.78 
1.93 
1.62 
1.67 
1.72 
Relational 
Performance 
 
REP1 
REP2 
REP3 
REP4 
.87 
.90 
.88 
.88 
* 
16.51 
15.81 
15.69 
.94 .87 .77 5.32 1.19 5.08 
5.43 
5.37 
5.37 
1.23 
1.32 
1.27 
1.26 
Foreign 
environmental 
uncertainty  
FEU1 
FEU2 
FEU3 
.74 
.92 
.63 
* 
10.45 
8.02 
.79 .74 .59 3.67 1.42 3.60 
3.62 
3.79 
1.77 
1.76 
1.57 
Foreign market 
dynamism 
FMD1 
FMD2 
FMD3 
FMD4 
FMD5 
FDM6 
.71 
.76 
.68 
.73 
.76 
.70 
* 
9.36 
8.51 
9.05 
9.36 
8.73 
.87 .79 .53 3.71 1.25 3.75 
4.10 
3.94 
3.34 
3.28 
3.80 
1.64 
1.61 
1.57 
1.57 
1.65 
1.66 
Dependence  DEP1 
DEP2 
DEP3 
DEP4 
.76 
.86 
.82 
.84 
* 
12.01 
11.42 
11.74 
.89 .83 .67 3.68 1.55 3.77 
4.03 
3.32 
3.59 
1.81 
1.80 
1.76 
1.82 
Tolerance  TOL3 
TOL2 
TOL5 
.85 
.62 
.64 
* 
6.10 
5.86 
.79 .68 .51 3.74 0.77 4.49 
3.17 
3.55 
1.60 
1.73 
1.64 
* Fit statistics of Model: χ2 = 1578.12, p = .000, df = 979; NFI = .93; NNFI = .96; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 Constructs 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. 
Relational Uncertainty 
 
1 
      
    
2. 
Opportunism  
 
.55 
1      
    
3. 
Inter-partner Incompatibility 
 
.51 
.59 1     
    
4. 
Relational Distance 
 
.50 
.35 .47 1    
    
5. 
Conflict 
 
.51 
.47 .60 .31 1   
    
6. 
Betrayal  
 
.58 
.53 .51 .48 .53 1  
    
7. 
Relational Performance 
 
-.52 
-.45 -.57 -.46 -.43 -.38 1 
    
8.  
Foreign environmental uncertainty 
 
.45 
.38 .29 .37 .33 .35 -.15 
1    
9. 
Foreign market dynamism 
 
.24 
.29 .18 .20 .30 .31 -.12 
.36 1   
10. 
Dependence 
 
.07 
.03 -.03 .01 .04 .09 .16 
.12 .14 1  
11. Tolerance -.04 -.06 -.07 -.09 -.01 -.17 -.04 -.10 .00 .05 1 
 
Note: Correlations greater than |± 0.15| are significant at the .01 level,     Correlations greater than |± 0.12| are significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Structural Model Results – Direct effects 
 
Hypo-
thesis 
 
Hypothesized path  
Standardized 
path coefficients  
t- 
value 
p- 
Value 
H1 
 
Relational Uncertainty → Betrayal  
 
.30 3.29 .00 
H2 
 
Opportunism → Betrayal 
  
.19 2.37 .02 
H3 
 
Inter-partner Incompatibility → Betrayal 
 
.21 2.40 .02 
H4 
 
Relational Distance → Betrayal  
 
.32 3.76 .00 
H5 
 
Conflict → Betrayal 
  
.28 3.41 .00 
H6 
 
Betrayal → Relational Performance 
 
-.39 4.56 .00 
Fit statistics: χ2 = 1329.68, p = .000, df = 428; NFI = .91; NNFI = .94; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .09 
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Table 4: Results of Individual Moderating Effects 
Foreign market uncertainty as a moderator 
Main effect Hypothesized moderating effect 
High foreign 
environmental  
uncertainty group 
Low foreign 
environmental 
uncertainty group 
∆χ2 
(Δd.f. =1) 
UNC →BET H7a: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
environmental uncertainty than the low 
foreign environmental uncertainty group 
β = .45 
t = 3.71** 
β = .15 
t = 1.29 
2.98 
(p<.10) 
OPP → BET H7b: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
environmental uncertainty than the low 
foreign environmental uncertainty group 
β = .34 
t = 2.95** 
β = .16 
t = 1.34 
5.13 
(p<.05) 
INC → BET H7c: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
environmental uncertainty than the low 
foreign environmental uncertainty group 
β = .32 
t = 2.75** 
β = .14 
t = 1.20 
3.14 
(p<.10) 
DIS → BET H7d: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
environmental uncertainty than the low 
foreign environmental uncertainty group 
β = .40 
t = 3.31** 
β = .37 
t = 3.17** 
1.77 
(p>.10) 
CNF → BET 
H7e: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
environmental uncertainty than the low 
foreign environmental uncertainty group 
β = .51 
t = 4.28** 
β = .11 
t = 1.03 
4.05 
(p<.05) 
Foreign market dynamism as a moderator 
Main effect Hypothesized moderating effect 
High foreign 
market dynamism 
group 
Low foreign 
market  
dynamism group 
∆χ2 
(Δd.f. =1) 
UNC →BET H8a: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
market dynamism than the low foreign 
market dynamism group 
β  = .38 
t = 3.44** 
β = .16 
t = 1.38 
2.89 
(p<.10) 
OPP → BET H8b: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
market dynamism than the low foreign 
market dynamism group 
β  = .32 
t = 3.00** 
β = .15 
t = 1.37 
2.87 
(p<.10) 
INC → BET H8c: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
market dynamism than the low foreign 
market dynamism group 
β  = .33 
t = 3.10** 
β = .17 
t = 1.50 
2.96 
(p<.10) 
DIS → BET H8d: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
market dynamism than the low foreign 
market dynamism group 
β  = .41 
t = 3.86** 
β = .13 
t = 1.28 
8.40 
(p<.01) 
CNF → BET 
H8e: Effect is stronger among high foreign 
market dynamism than the low foreign 
market dynamism group 
β  = .31 
t = 3.04** 
β = .26 
t = 2.29* 
1.15 
(p>.10) 
Dependence as a moderator 
Main effect Hypothesized moderating effect 
High dependence  
group 
Low dependence 
group 
∆χ2 
(Δd.f. =1) 
BET → REP H9: Effect is stronger among high dependence 
than the low dependence group 
β  = .74 
t = 5.65** 
β  = .70 
t = 4.46** 
2.84 
(p<.10) 
Tolerance as a moderator 
Main effect Hypothesized moderating effect 
High tolerance  
group 
Low tolerance 
group 
∆χ2 
(Δd.f. =1) 
BET → REP H10: Effect is stronger among high depen-
dence than the low dependence group 
β  = .75 
t = 6.11** 
β = .69 
t = 4.22** 
2.80 
(p<.10) 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Figure 1: The conceptual model 
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Appendix: Operationalization of constructs 
Constructs 
 
Items  Item description 
Source 
Relational 
uncertainty 
UNC1 
UNC2 
UNC3 
UNC4 
UNC5 
Our relationship with this importer is characterized by a great degree of uncertainty. 
There is adequate information for us to make future decisions regarding this working relationship. (R) 
We face difficulties in monitoring trends concerning the working relationship with this importer.  
We are confident about making future decisions regarding aspects of the relationship with this importer. (R) 
We cannot accurately anticipate how this importer will act in the future in the working relationship. 
 
Leonidou 
and Kaleka 
(1998)  
Opportunism  OPP1 
OPP2 
OPP3 
OPP4 
This importer alters the facts slightly. 
This importer promises to do things without actually doing them later. 
This importer fails to provide us with the support s/he is obliged to provide. 
This importer avoids fulfilling his/her responsibilities unless s/he is watched  closely. 
 
Yilmaz and 
Hunt (2001) 
Inter-partner 
incompatibi-
lity 
INC1 
INC2 
INC3 
INC4 
INC5 
The organizational values and social norms that pertain between our company and this importer are not compatible. 
Executives from our firm and those from this importer have incompatible philosophies/approaches to business. 
The goals and objectives of our firm are compatible with those of this importer. (R) 
The technical capabilities of our firm are incompatible with those of this importer. 
The organizational procedures of our firm and those of this importer are compatible. (R) 
Employees of both our company and this importer have similar professional or trade skills. (R) 
Sarkar et al. 
(1998) 
Relationship 
Distance 
DIS1 
DIS2 
DIS3 
DIS4 
DIS5 
We do not have close relationships with individuals working in this importing firm. 
We are not familiar with this importer’s business environment.  
We are very familiar with the organizational culture, values, and attitudes of this importer. (R) 
We are not aware of many things about the structural characteristics of this importer’s organization. 
We are familiar with the working methods and processes followed by this importer. (R) 
 
 Hallén and 
Sandstörm 
(1991) 
Conflict CNF1 
CNF2 
CNF3 
CNF4 
CNF5 
The roles in the working relationship with this importer are not performed as required, causing many disagreements. 
Often unreasonable demands arise in the relationship with this importer, causing a great deal of frustration. 
The working relationship with this importer is very stressful and worrying, resulting in a lot of tension. 
There are often disagreements between our firm and this importer on issues concerning the relationship. 
The working relationship with this importer is characterized by a high degree of conflict. 
Etgar (1979), 
Kumar et al. 
(1992) 
Betrayal BET1 
BET2 
BET3 
BET4 
BET5 
BET6 
We have frequently caught this importer disclosing confidential information about our relationship to other companies.   
Whenever this importer finds an opportunity to do so, s/he is disloyal to us. 
Our confidence in this importer has been undermined because of him/her attempting to find another exporter of similar goods. 
This importer has let us down many times with his/her dishonest behavior. 
We have lost faith in this importer as a result of our experience of the working relationship. 
This importer has often failed to offer expected assistance in times of great need.  
Coffey et al. 
(1996),  
Grégoire and 
Fisher 
(2008) 
Relational 
performance 
REP1 
REP2 
REP3 
REP4 
 
The relationship between our firm and this importer has been very productive.  
We have found the time and effort spent on this relationship very worthwhile. 
The relationship between our firm and this importer has been very effective.  
We have a very rewarding relationship with this importer. 
LaBahn and 
Harich 
(1997) 
Foreign 
environmental 
uncertainty  
FMU1 
FMU2 
FMU3 
FMU4 
FMU5 
It is very difficult to predict demand in the market in which this importer operates. 
Working with this importer, it is very difficult to arrive at accurate sales forecasts. 
The environment surrounding our working relationship with this importer is characterized by volatile market shares. 
The market in which we operate with this importer is characterized by many new products. 
There are many new competitors in the market in which this importer operates. 
Ganesan 
(1994) 
Foreign 
market 
dynamism 
FMD1 
FMD2 
FMD3 
FMD4 
FMD5 
FDM6 
Firms operating in this importer’s market frequently change the mix of products that they carry. 
There are frequent changes in the sales strategies of firms operating in  this importer’s market. 
Firms in this importer’s market frequently change their promotional/advertising strategies. 
Customer preferences for brands change very quickly in the importer’s  market. 
Buyer preferences for product quality frequently change in the importer’s market. 
The preferences of buyers with regard to price tend to change quickly in the importer’s market. 
 
Raven et al. 
(1994) 
 
Dependence DEP1 
DEP2 
DEP3 
DEP4 
 
If our relationship with this importer was discontinued, we would have difficulty making up the sales in his/her foreign market. 
It would be difficult for us to replace this importer. 
We are quite dependent on this importer. 
We do not have a good alternative to this importer in the foreign market. 
Jap and 
Ganesan 
2000 
Tolerance TOL1 
TOL2 
TOL3 
TOL4 
TOL5 
We could accept any changes in the relationship with this importer, in order to correct problems resulting from his bad conduct.  
If, occasionally, this importer did not fulfill his/her obligations (e.g., payment delays), we would consider leaving him/her. (R) 
If this importer holds back information that could be useful to us, we would not consider leaving him/her. 
If this importer made excessive demands, we would not consider abandoning him/her.   
If, occasionally, this importer did not attempt to correct his/her failures, we would consider leaving him/her. (R) 
 
Pettersen and  
Rokkan 
(2006) 
Note: Measurement was based on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree.  The sign (R) denotes a reverse scale 
